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I 
INTRODUCTION 
According to the advocates of greater corporate involvement in clinical 
science, the increasingly entwined relationship between corporations, academia 
and government is the very definition of a “win–win” situation.  Corporations 
can benefit from the knowledge of scientists in academia or government, and 
the public benefits from the more rapid movement of beneficial products into 
commerce. 
That argument, however, ignores a fundamental clash of cultures.  Progress 
in science is based on the free publication of study results and on the public 
release of data, allowing scientists to build on the experiences of others.  In 
contrast, the governing ethic in the corporate sector is secrecy—the withholding 
of any information from which a competitor might benefit.  There is perhaps no 
realm in which these competing viewpoints are presented more starkly than in 
the area of access to pharmaceutical data at the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA). 
Those committed to the free exchange of scientific information have long 
complained about various restrictions on access to these pharmaceutical data 
and the resultant restrictions on open discourse.  Such restrictions include the 
selective publication of favorable results,2 gag orders on corporate-funded 
research,3 and misleading presentations of data.4  Only in the last several years 
have these concerns penetrated public consciousness.  Two recent examples 
demonstrate the problems these restrictions create: 
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 1. BOB DYLAN, Lovesick, on TIME OUT OF MIND (Columbia Records 1997). 
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 2. An-Wen Chan et al., Empirical Evidence for Selective Reporting of Outcomes in Randomized 
Trials: Comparison of Protocols to Published Articles, 291 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2457, 2462–64 (2004); An-
Wen Chan & Douglas G. Altman, Identifying Outcome Reporting Bias in Randomized Trials on 
PubMed: Review of Publications and Survey of Authors, 330 BRIT. MED. J. 753, 756–57 (2005). 
 3. Drummond Rennie, Thyroid Storm, 277 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1238, 1239–40 (1997). 
 4. Elizabeth Barbehenn et al., Alosetron for Irritable Bowel Syndrome, 356 LANCET 2009 (2000). 
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The first example involves the selective publication of data on the efficacy of 
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) antidepressants in children.  
Despite objective evidence demonstrating that SSRI’s are, at best, moderately 
effective in children,5 published studies generally exaggerated the benefits of 
these drugs, while certain negative studies provided to FDA were never 
published.  Industry-funded academic scientists withheld from publication some 
studies that failed to demonstrate drug efficacy,6 the inclusion of which would 
have altered the risk–benefit profile of the drugs.7  Despite these efforts, an 
FDA analysis of published and unpublished pediatric SSRI trials ultimately led 
to the addition of a black box to the FDA-approved label that warned of the 
increased risk of suicidal ideation in children and adolescents.8 
In another revealing example, the Journal of the American Medical 
Association published a report in 2001 claiming that, after six months of 
therapy, the COX-2 inhibitor celecoxib (Celebrex) was associated with a 
reduced incidence of gastrointestinal ulcers compared to two other pain 
medications.9  If true, this outcome would have represented a significant 
advantage over other approved pain medications.  However, the authors of the 
study failed to disclose that at the time of publication they had already received 
data for the full twelve-month period for which the study was originally 
designed.10  The twelve-month data showed no advantage for Celebrex over 
other drugs.  Although the FDA, armed with the twelve-month data, has never 
allowed the company to claim reduced ulcer incidence, the published study 
helped drive the massive Celebrex market. 
Together, these two cases underscore the harms resulting from the ability of 
pharmaceutical companies to withhold data from the view of physicians and 
patients.  Moreover, even when such data are available to the FDA, for reasons 
described below, the agency may fail to disclose the data publicly, further 
limiting the public’s access to accurate information. 
Some observers have suggested that a registry of clinical trials would shed 
more light on the drug-approval process.  In theory, companies (or others) 
forced to register their studies at the point-of-study initiation and ultimately to 
disclose their results would be more accountable to regulators, researchers, and 
patients.  However, a review of open-government procedures and litigation at 
the FDA demonstrates that the need for transparency at the agency extends 
 
 5. Jon N. Jureidini et al., Efficacy and Safety of Antidepressants for Children and Adolescents, 328 
BRIT. MED. J. 879, 882 (2004). 
 6. Barry Meier, Contracts Keep Drug Research Out of Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2004, at A1. 
 7. Craig J. Whittington et al., Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors in Childhood Depression: 
Systematic Review of Published versus Unpublished Data, 363 LANCET 1341, 1344–45 (2004). 
 8. Food & Drug Admin., Patient Information Sheet: Celecoxib (Apr. 7, 2005), 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/celebrex/Celebrex-ptsk.pdf. 
 9. Fred E. Silverstein et al., Gastrointestinal Toxicity with Celecoxib vs Nonsteroidal Anti-
Inflammatory Drugs for Osteoarthritis and Rheumatoid Arthritis: The CLASS Study: A Randomized 
Controlled Trial, 284 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1247 (2000). 
 10. Susan Okie, Missing Data on Celebrex; Full Study Altered Picture of Drug, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 
2001, at A11. 
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well beyond the reach of any clinical trial registry.  Accordingly, efforts to 
expand openness and accountability must view trial registries as only one 
component of a broader open-government strategy.  This article will confine 
itself to the approval of drugs at the FDA; the approval process for devices and 
biologics is similar. 
II 
THE FDA DRUG APPROVAL PROCESS 
For most drugs, the journey toward potential FDA approval begins with 
preclinical animal testing.  Assuming that the results of such testing provide 
sufficient hints of drug efficacy to merit testing in humans, the company will 
complete an Investigational New Drug (IND) application and submit it to the 
FDA (see Figure 1).  Upon approval of that application, the company can begin 
Phase I studies in humans.  These studies typically focus on assessing drug 
safety in relatively crude terms; typically, only a few dozen patients or normal 
volunteers are included.  If the drug does not prove to be inordinately toxic, the 
sponsor may elect to proceed to Phase II.  Such trials, which normally include a 
few hundred patients, seek to define drug toxicity more closely by examining a 
variety of doses and to provide some indications of drug efficacy.  If the drug 
passes that hurdle, the company may proceed to Phase III, in which large-scale, 
randomized clinical trials are conducted, and both safety and efficacy are 
assessed.  These trials are usually the principal ones upon which the FDA bases 
its decision whether to approve a new drug. 
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Figure 1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To obtain permission to market a new drug, the sponsor must submit a New 
Drug Application (NDA), which includes all the results of pre-clinical and 
clinical trials, as well as additional studies evaluating the chemical properties of 
the drug and pharmacokinetic studies of the dosage form.  Since the early 1990s, 
the FDA has followed a bifurcated process for NDAs.  Those deemed to be a 
“significant improvement compared to marketed products” are considered 
priority applications.  The agency seeks to make a decision regarding approval 
of those drugs within six months.  For other drugs, which generally do not 
represent significant therapeutic advances over existing therapies, the agency 
generally completes review in one year. 
As part of its consideration of an NDA, the FDA sometimes refers the 
application to one of the FDA’s advisory committees.  An advisory committee 
is a group of outside experts chosen by the FDA to provide advice and non-
binding recommendations to the agency on topics such as drug approval.  Of 
late, because of the rigid approval deadlines imposed upon the agency by 
Congress, a declining fraction of new drugs has been subject to this additional 
stratum of review.  In 2001, the approval of only twenty-one percent of new 
molecular entities was preceded by an advisory committee meeting.11 
 
 11. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REPORT NO. 
OEI-01-01-00590, FDA’S REVIEW PROCESS FOR NEW DRUG APPLICATIONS: A MANAGEMENT 
REVIEW 42 (2003). 
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Even if the drug meets with the FDA’s approval, the agency still has the 
authority to make that approval contingent upon the sponsor’s conducting of 
post-marketing studies, often referred to as Phase IV studies.  These studies 
usually focus on safety issues and may take the form of registries, studies in 
special populations, or full clinical trials.  The evidence to date is that 
companies often do not complete Phase IV studies.12  The FDA, unsure of its 
authority to enforce the post-approval requirement, has made little if any effort 
to ensure that the studies are conducted. 
III 
OPEN GOVERNMENT STATUTES 
Generally, the FDA’s approach to data disclosure has been that no public 
disclosure of information will take place until (and unless) a drug is approved.13  
Indeed, the agency will not even acknowledge that an IND or an NDA has been 
filed, although companies filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
report such information and often ensure that positive findings from their 
studies receive media coverage.  For those drugs that are evaluated by FDA 
advisory committees, there is an additional, brief window in which the NDA is 
formally acknowledged and the data supporting the application are disclosed. 
The two statutes that have provided the greatest access to pharmaceutical 
data are the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA)14 and the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA).15  FACA ensures that advisory committees are subject 
to transparency requirements such as advance notice of upcoming meetings, 
opportunities for public attendance and input, and the preparation of 
transcripts.16  FOIA requires public disclosure, upon request by any individual, 
of agency documents that do not fall into one of nine specific exemptions from 
disclosure.17 
In 2004, the FDA processed a total of 18,540 FOIA requests at a cost of 
$12.8 million.18  By permitting the online posting of certain frequently requested 
documents, the Internet has eased the agency’s workload somewhat.  But the 
backlog has nevertheless continued to grow and stood at 16,671 pending 
requests at the end of 2004. 
The agency processes requests in two tracks: simple and complex.  The latter 
category applies to requests seeking a voluminous number of records or records 
from which the agency will want to redact information that falls under one of 
 
 12. Larry D. Sasich et al., The Drug Industry’s Performance in Finishing Postmarketing Research 
(Phase IV) Studies (Apr. 13, 2000), http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=6721. 
 13. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.430(b)–(d). 
 14. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. II §§ 1–15 (2000). 
 15. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). 
 16. 5 U.S.C. app. II §§ 10–11. 
 17. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2000). 
 18. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION. ANNUAL FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) 
REPORT, FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2004, available at http://www.fda.gov/foi/annual2004.html. 
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the FOIA exemptions.  For 2004, the agency reported that eighty-nine percent 
of the requests it received were simple and usually processed in a median of 
twenty-five days.  Eleven percent were considered complex and were processed 
in a median of 325 days.  In no instance did the FDA expedite processing in 
repsonse to a requester’s assertion of “an exceptional need or urgency,”19 the 
standard for expediting. 
In 2004, the majority (67.6%) of the FOIA requests processed by the FDA 
were granted in full.  A further 31.9% resulted in nondisclosure—most 
commonly because there were either no relevant agency records or because the 
request was withdrawn.  Partial satisfaction of the request occurred in forty-five 
instances, while complete denials ensued in thirty-seven.  These two categories 
of responses are the ones that may lead to litigation. 
Over the course of 2004, the FDA claimed a FOIA exemption 114 times; 
some cases included claims for multiple exemptions.  By far the most common 
exemptions claimed were the exemptions for confidential commercial 
information (fifty-three exemptions) and investigatory records (twenty-eight 
exemptions).  The remaining claims were based on exemptions for internal 
agency rules, material for which disclosure is prohibited by another statute, 
internal agency memoranda, and personal privacy. 
IV 
CASES RESULTING FROM FOIA REQUESTS: A REVIEW20 
A. Case 1: Abandoned Investigational New Drug Applications 
In Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Food & Drug Administration 
(Schering),21 Public Citizen submitted a FOIA request to the FDA requesting 
copies of IND submissions for five drugs that had been effectively abandoned 
by their manufacturers for safety reasons.  The FDA denied the request, 
claiming that the records fell under the FOIA exemption for confidential 
commercial information.  Public Citizen then sued to compel disclosure.  In the 
first prong of its argument, Public Citizen contended that the requirement of 21 
U.S.C § 355(l)—that “safety and effectiveness data” for a drug abandoned by its 
sponsor must be disclosed “unless extraordinary circumstances are shown”—
 
 19. Id. at III(B)(6). 
 20. The cases reviewed below were obtained by searching the Westlaw database for published 
cases and from unpublished cases litigated by the Public Citizen Litigation Group.  The timeframe of 
each case relative to the FDA review process described above is indicated in Figure 1.   
 The authors also reviewed law review articles regarding FDA and the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA).  The most relevant article mounts a general critique of the trade secret status of health and 
safety information and suggests that FDA has erred in its nearly unlimited granting of trade secret 
status to such information.  See Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of 
Health and Safety Testing Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. REV. 837 
(1980). 
 21. Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Food & Drug Admin. (Schering), 185 F.3d 898 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999). 
05__LURIE_ZIEVE.DOC 10/4/2006  9:04 AM 
Summer 2006] SOMETIMES THE SILENCE CAN BE LIKE THE THUNDER 91 
applied to INDs as well as to NDAs.22  The court ruled, however, that the 
relevant section applies to NDAs only.23 
In arguing that the IND submissions were not protected under the 
confidential commercial information exemption, Public Citizen contended that 
they should be released to determine whether the FDA was adequately 
protecting trial subjects and to allow competitors to avert potentially risky trials 
of related drugs.  This argument, too, failed to convince the court, which held 
that the bulk of the IND material did fall within the scope of that exemption.  
The court further stated that the purpose of FOIA is merely to monitor “what 
the government is up to”, and thus that any other benefits of disclosure are not 
relevant to analysis under that exemption.24  In other words, the confidential 
commercial exemption does not authorize the courts to weigh the public 
interest in disclosure against the potential competitive harm that disclosure may 
cause.  The court ordered the release of the one IND application for which it 
found that disclosure was not likely to cause substantial competitive harm, as 
required for protection under that exemption.25 
In a similar, earlier case, Public Citizen sought records regarding preclinical 
and clinical testing of fialuridine, a drug that had caused the deaths of five 
patients in clinical trials for Hepatitis B infection at the National Institutes of 
Health.26  Despite this striking toxicity, the drug’s sponsor, Eli Lilly, claimed 
that it would continue to develop the drug.27  The FDA and the drug’s sponsor 
argued that the materials sought were subject to the confidential commercial 
information exemption.  The court agreed, noting in an unreported decision 
that the records fell within the scope of that exemption because the information 
they contained might save Lilly’s competitors both time and money in doing 
their own research.  Again, under this ruling, such public health concerns as 
avoiding the exposure of clinical-trial subjects (or patients in general after the 
drug’s approval) to drugs closely related to fialuridine were not factors in the 
FOIA analysis. 
B. Case 2: Advisory Committee Materials 
In Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Food & Drug Administration 
(Searle),28 Public Citizen sought access under both FOIA and FACA to 
materials provided to the members of the Arthritis Drugs Advisory Committee 
prior to the committee’s meeting on the drug Celebrex.  The FDA eventually 
provided the material, but not until well after the advisory committee meeting 
 
 22. 21 U.S.C. § 355(l) (2000) 
 23. Schering, 185 F.3d at 901. 
 24. Id. at 904. 
 25. Id. at 906. 
 26. Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Food & Drug Admin. (Searle), Civ. A. No. 94-
0017(RMU) (D.D.C. April 10, 1995) 
 27. The drug had never been approved for use in any condition. 
 28. Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 2000 WL 34262802 (D.D.C. 2000). 
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had taken place.  Public Citizen sued the agency, complaining both about the 
redaction of specific types of information from the material and about the 
FDA’s continuing failure to make advisory committee materials available to the 
public prior to meetings. 
The FACA portion of the case, which the parties settled, is probably the 
more significant.  Under FACA, the FDA is required to provide to the public—
at or before each advisory committee meeting—the materials provided to the 
advisory committee members in connection with each meeting.  These materials 
consist of FDA reviews of an NDA, which generally include one or more 
medical officer’s reviews, a pharmacologist’s review, and a statistical review, as 
well as materials provided by the drug’s sponsor.  The documents are crucial to 
the public’s ability to participate meaningfully in advisory committee meetings 
because, as discussed above, the FDA generally does not even acknowledge the 
existence of an NDA, let alone make any of its contents public, prior to the 
meeting.  Thus, the advisory committee briefing materials are often the first 
glimpse the public has of the data underlying the NDA.  The FDA agreed to 
settle this portion of the case by promising to place the materials provided to 
advisory committee members on the FDA’s website twenty-four hours before 
each advisory committee meeting.29 These often extensive materials are now 
downloaded before the meeting by people seeking to comment in the public 
session and by stock analysts and the media.  The availability of this material 
has revolutionized the quality of public comment and media coverage.  
Frequently, the stock market will react to the release of these documents, even 
prior to the meeting. 
The parties litigated the FOIA part of the case, which resulted in disclosure 
of certain types of information that the FDA had redacted from the medical 
officer’s review of the Celebrex NDA.  This aspect of the case involved fact-
specific issues and so is not described here. 
C. Case 3: FDA Advisory Committee Member Conflict-of-Interest Statements 
In 1997, Congress passed the Food and Drug Administration Modernization 
Act.30  A little-noticed portion of the Act required the FDA to make a more 
comprehensive disclosure of the potential conflicts of interest of its advisory 
committee members and FDA-invited voting consultants.31  By September 2001, 
FDA had done little to expand such disclosures, and Public Citizen threatened 
the agency with a lawsuit for noncompliance.  To avert such a lawsuit, the 
agency drafted a compliance document that required more detailed conflict-of-
 
 29. These same materials are often provided to the drug’s sponsor well before the advisory 
committee meeting, but the FDA says that additional time is needed to redact exempted material 
before disclosure to the public. 
 30. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 
(1997). 
 31. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (n)(4) (2000). 
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interest disclosure.32  For example, advisory committee members must now 
disclose the ranges of remuneration by the particular companies with whom 
they have associations in the form of honoraria, contracts, expert testimony in 
product liability cases, and stock holdings.  These disclosures are now 
announced in detail by the committee’s executive secretary before each 
advisory committee meeting at which a specific product is being discussed.  
Such disclosures are not made public at meetings that concern general scientific 
issues, and the FDA still does not require the disclosure of the names of 
competing companies with whom an advisory committee member has an 
association. 
D. Case 4: Data about Disapproved Uses 
In November 2001, the FDA granted approval to Pfizer for its COX-2 
inhibitor valdecoxib (Bextra) for three uses (menstrual pain, rheumatoid 
arthritis, and osteoarthritis), but rejected its application for acute pain.  In 
accordance with its standard practice, the FDA then posted on its website the 
FDA medical officers’ reviews and other material related to the agency’s 
evaluation of the drug for all four uses.  Within a few days, Pfizer complained to 
the FDA that the agency’s posting included material about acute pain, the use 
rejected by FDA.  At Pfizer’s request, FDA then took the Bextra material off 
its website and reposted it several months later, after redacting information 
about use of the drug for acute pain.  In the meantime, an article by Pfizer-
sponsored researchers appeared in the Journal of the American Dental 
Association (JADA)33 touting the drug for acute pain.  The conclusions of the 
article were reiterated in an accompanying press release.34  However, neither the 
article nor the press release mentioned the FDA’s rejection of the NDA with 
respect to acute pain.  Due to the FDA’s treatment of the acute pain material as 
confidential commercial information, the assertions of the journal article and 
the press release went unrefuted, resulting in an incomplete and biased public 
record.35  According to a New York Times investigation, the JADA study 
“helped light a fire under Bextra,” which experienced a sixty percent increase in 
sales in the three months following the article’s publication. 
Public Citizen later made a FOIA request for complete, unredacted copies 
of the medical officers’ reviews of the Bextra NDA and in 2004 sued to obtain 
 
 32. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION. DRAFT GUIDANCE ON DISCLOSURE OF CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST FOR SPECIAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES PARTICIPATING IN FDA PRODUCT SPECIFIC 
ADVISORY COMMITTEES (2002), available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/guidance/advisorycommittee.html. 
 33. Stephen E. Daniels et al., The Analgesic Efficacy of Valdecoxib vs. Oxycodone/Acetaminophen 
After Oral Surgery, 133 J. AM. DENTAL ASS’N 611 (2002). 
 34. Melody Petersen, Madison Ave. Has Growing Role in the Business of Drug Research, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 22, 2002, at A1. 
 35. Companies, particularly start-ups hungry for venture capital, now use their mandatory reports 
to the Securities and Exchange Commission to tout each step in the drug development process, further 
distorting the public record. 
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the information.36  In response, the FDA released most of the information 
sought, and Public Citizen then dismissed the case.  The released information 
showed an increased risk of serious thromboembolic events in patients using 
Bextra and undergoing coronary artery bypass grafts—the same adverse effect 
subsequently reported in another study of Bextra.37  Similar toxicity has been 
documented for the other COX-2 inhibitors, rofecoxib (Vioxx) and Celebrex.38  
Bextra and Vioxx have since been removed from the market. 
E. Case 5: Abandoned NDAs 
As noted above, court rulings had previously held that abandoned INDs are 
not automatically disclosable.  In Davis v. Food and Drug Administration,39 the 
plaintiff sought the release of information related to abandoned NDAs—those 
submitted to the FDA for approval but never approved.  The case was settled 
because the FDA conceded the disclosability of such information.  However, 
because of the size of the materials requested, the litigants entered into a 
compromise as to which materials would be disclosed.  Importantly, the FDA 
agreed not to assert the FOIA exemption protecting from disclosure agency 
deliberative material with respect to abandoned NDAs.  Unfortunately, 
because the decision whether to abandon efforts to develop a drug is entirely up 
to the company and because a statement about its plans in this regard is not 
verifiable, any company is free to make broad claims that it has not abandoned 
its efforts with respect to an NDA and thereby to thwart disclosure. 
F. Case 6: Phase IV Protocols 
The FDA sometimes makes approval of an NDA conditional upon the 
company’s conducting certain post-marketing or Phase IV studies.  In Public 
Citizen Health Research Group v. Food & Drug Administration (Glucophage 
Study),40 Public Citizen sought the protocol for a Phase IV study of metformin 
(Glucophage).  The FDA had required the study to establish the incidence of a 
drug-induced metabolic disorder called lactic acidosis.  The protocol would 
provide a detailed description of the study design, including its inclusion 
criteria, length of follow-up, outcome measures and statistical procedures. 
Bristol-Myers Squibb, the drug’s manufacturer, intervened in the lawsuit.  
Both Bristol-Myers and FDA argued that the protocols were properly withheld 
 
 36. Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Food & Drug Admin., No. 04-304 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 
26, 2004); See Public Citizen Health Research Group, Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 
(Feb. 26, 2004), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF5CF.pdf. 
 37. Bextra package insert, Pfizer, Inc. (2004), available at http://www.pfizer.com/download/ 
uspi_bextra.pdf. 
 38. Dawn Jennings-Peterson & Sidney M. Wolfe, Petition to Remove the Cox-2 Inhibitors 
Celecoxib (Celebrex) and Valdecoxib (Bextra) from the Market (Jan. 24, 2005), 
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7358. 
 39. Davis v. Food & Drug Admin., No. 01-982 (D.D.C. filed May 9, 2001). 
 40. Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Food & Drug Admin. (Glucophage Study), 964 F. 
Supp. 413 (D.D.C. 1997). 
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under the confidential commercial information FOIA exemption.41  The court 
applied the two-pronged test first enunciated in National Parks & Conservation 
Association v. Morton.42  Under that test, material falls within the scope of the 
confidential commercial information exemption only if disclosure is likely to (1) 
impair the government’s ability to obtain information in the future; or (2) cause 
substantial competitive harm to the person who had submitted the information.  
The FDA and the company argued that both requirements were satisfied with 
respect to the Glucophage protocol.43 
Regarding the first element, the court held that the agency’s “argument is 
unsupported, even by an assertion of agency experience on the point.”44  For the 
second element, the likelihood of substantial competitive harm, the company 
argued that disclosure would cause patient drop-out and bias and that 
competitors would raise “alarmist” safety concerns, learn the results of pre-
approval testing, and gain insight into Bristol-Myers Squibb’s future marketing 
strategy.  The court sought the input of two independent experts, and both 
agreed that release of the protocol would not be likely to harm the company at 
all.  The court then ordered the agency to release the protocol. 
In several instances since then, Public Citizen has submitted FOIA requests 
for Phase IV study protocols.  In the first two instances, the FDA refused to 
disclose the protocol until Public Citizen filed a lawsuit.  The FDA has since 
begun to release such protocols upon request, in compliance with FOIA and 
without litigation. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
At each step of the drug approval process, a variety of documents of 
potential relevance to the public health are generated.  Numerous contentious 
legal battles have been waged to obtain public access to information generated 
during various stages in this process, with FDA typically weighing in alongside 
the manufacturer and favoring nondisclosure.  Obstacles to the release of 
information at each of these stages must be addressed if optimal transparency in 
the drug approval process is to be assured. 
Much recent attention has focused on the potential of clinical trial registries 
to enhance data disclosure.45  There can be little question that such registries 
would significantly expand data availability.  With such registries, the results of 
the studies would be disclosed in a more transparent fashion, and the interested 
community would be able to monitor the registry for the results of studies said 
to be close to completion.  In such circumstances, the kinds of nondisclosure 
 
 41. Id. at 414. 
 42. Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
 43. Glucophage Study, 964 F. Supp. at 415. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Robert Steinbrook, Public Registration of Clinical Trials, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 315 (2004). 
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observed in the Vioxx and SSRI studies would be essentially impossible.  In a 
parallel development, medical journal editors, stung by revelations that the 
published literature may not fully reflect scientific knowledge and that they 
have been unable to publish studies in their entirety or even at all, have stated 
their intention to publish only those studies that are preregistered.46 
Nonetheless, registries would leave many forms of data-withholding intact.  
Indeed, of the cases reviewed here, only two would be affected by registries: 
Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Food and Drug Administration 
(Bextra) (redactions for disapproved uses) and Davis v. Food and Drug 
Administration (abandoned NDAs).  In each of these cases, disclosure 
ultimately took place as part of a settlement, leaving behind no binding 
precedent.  As a result, the FDA could try to withhold similar information in 
the future.  However, a registry requirement would ensure more rapid 
disclosure, eliminating the need for a FOIA request or litigation. 
In our view, a meaningful clinical-trial registry would have to include all 
efficacy trials for drugs and biologics.  The registry would have to include, in 
abstract and tabular form, the basic elements of each study’s design (for 
example, study arms, sample size, inclusion criteria, planned primary and 
secondary endpoints) and results as they became available.  A short delay, not 
exceeding twelve months, to permit the publishing of results should be 
permitted.  Unlike the registries or disclosures envisioned by some members of 
the pharmaceutical industry, registering a trial should be mandatory, and failure 
to do so should be subject to significant punishments, including financial 
penalties.  Bills that include these basic requirements have been drafted for 
both the United States Senate and House of Representatives,47 but face an 
uphill struggle to passage. 
Interestingly, the Department of Health and Human Services, which 
includes the FDA, does have a tradition of more expansive disclosure than that 
currently practiced by the FDA.  For over twenty years, the National Institutes 
of Health’s Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee has publicly disclosed 
summary safety and effectiveness data for studies related to human gene 
therapy and xenotransplantation.  As one of its outgoing gestures, the Clinton 
Administration proposed extending the same level of disclosure to the FDA.48  
That proposal has since been abandoned.49 
This article has described how small dents have been made in the imposing 
edifice of the confidential commercial information exemption.  The larger 
 
 46. Catherine A. De Angelis et al., Clinical Trial Registration: A Statement from the International 
Committee of Medical Journal Editors, 141 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 477 (2004). 
 47. Fair Access to Clinical Trials Act, H.R. 5252, 108th Cong. (2004); Fair Access to Clinical Trials 
Act, S. 2933, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 48. Availability of Public Disclosure and Submission to FDA for Public Disclosure of Certain Data 
and Information Related to Human Gene Therapy or Xenotransplantation, 66 Fed. Reg. 4688 (Jan. 18, 
2001). 
 49. Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, 67 Fed. Reg 3304-01 (May 
13, 2002). 
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question remains—why trade secret law should automatically trump public 
health concerns.  If the courts can find no justification in law for balancing 
private property rights against the public interest, it is time for the Congress to 
step in and make the need for such a balance explicit. 
